Prior research finds that statistically significant results are overrepresented in scientific publications. If significant results are consistently favored in the review process, published results could systematically overstate the magnitude of their findings even under ideal conditions. In this paper, we measure the impact of this publication bias on political science using a new data set of published quantitative results. Although any measurement of publication bias depends on the prior distribution of empirical relationships, we determine that published estimates in political science are on average substantially larger than their true value under a variety of reasonable choices for this prior. We also find that many published estimates have a false positive probability substantially greater than the conventional α = 0.05 threshold for statistical significance if the prior probability of a null relationship exceeds 50%. Finally, although the proportion of published false positives would be reduced if significance tests used a smaller α, this change would not solve the problem of upward bias in the magnitude of published results.
Introduction
Many academic papers (and especially the first few articles on a topic) describe relationships that turn out to be illusory upon closer examination (Ioannidis, 2005) . Additionally, the typical published estimate is probably of larger magnitude than the true relationship (Ioannidis, 2008) . Recent large-scale attempts to replicate social scientific findings have discovered that many of these findings become substantially smaller and more uncertain than initially indicated (Hartshorne and Schachner, 2012; Klein et al., 2014; Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014; Ioannidis et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Boekel et al., 2015; Camerer et al., 2016) ; the "replication crisis" has plagued fields in the hard sciences as well (e.g., Prinz, Schlange and Khusru, 2011; Begley and Ellis, 2012; Steward et al., 2012) . Replicability problems are exacerbated by researcher behaviors like p-hacking (analyzing the same data in multiple ways but only reporting the most statistically significant findings).
1 But even if behaviors like this were eliminated, the problems would continue to exist because While much of the previous work in this area focuses on establishing that publication bias is real and pervasive in disciplines that use statistical evidence (e.g., by using "caliper tests"
of published p-values, as in Malhotra 2008a and Brodeur et al. 2016) , our paper seeks to determine how publication bias has affected the accumulated body of knowledge in political science. We measure the impact of publication bias on political science using a new data set of published quantitative results. Although any measurement of publication bias depends on the prior distribution of empirical relationships, we estimate that published results in political science are distorted to a substantively meaningful degree under a variety of reasonable choices for this prior.
We come to three conclusions. First, published estimates of relationships in political science are on average substantially larger than their true value. The exact degree of upward bias depends on the choice of prior, but at the high end we estimate that the true value of published relationships is on average 40% smaller than their published value. More optimistic priors yield a lower average bias, but still find that at least 14% of results are biased upward by 10% or more. Second, we find that many published results have a false positive probability substantially greater than the conventional α = 0.05 threshold for statistical significance if the prior probability of a null relationship exceeds 50%. These two findings are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to results uncovered by the large scale replication studies noted above, suggesting that publication bias can explain much of the "replication crisis" these studies have observed.
3 Finally, we find that both the upward bias in magnitude and the probability of being a false positive is smaller for results with p-values further from the threshold for significance. Our last finding suggests that requiring a more stringent statistical significance test (with a smaller α) for publication might be effective at combating publication bias (Johnson, 2013) . Unfortunately, although the proportion of published false positives would be reduced by this strategy (Goodman, 2001; Bayarri et al., 2016) , we find that such a reform would not solve the problem of upward bias in published results: published results near the new threshold of significance would still be (on average) substantially biased upward.
Measurement strategy
Trying to measure the degree of upward bias in an estimateβ of some parameter β, or the prevalence of false positives (statistically significant estimates ofβ when the null β = 0 is true), is tricky. Any measurement depends on an assumption about the true value of β (or a probability distribution of beliefs about its value, f (β)). For example, consider the distribution of statistically significant estimatesβ associated with a true value of β.
Publication bias implies that E β |β, t ≥ |t 0.05 | = β, wheret =β/σβ is the t-statistic, σβ is the estimated standard error ofβ, and t (df,0.05) is the critical t value for a two-tailed significance test under a null hypothesis β = 0 setting α = Pr(significant|β = 0) = 0.05 with d f many degrees of freedom. For a fixed and known β, we could calculate the degree of publication bias as: 
where β = t (df,0.05) σβ (that is, the smallest statistically significantβ) and τ is the t probability density function. That is, we define bias as the difference between the expected value of statistically significant estimates and the true value of the estimand. 4 Note that E β |β, t ≥ t (d f ,0.05) − β is different thanβ − E β|β, t ≥ t (d f ,0.05) ; bias in one does not necessarily imply bias in the other. We study E β |β, t ≥ t (d f ,0.05) − β because our understanding of the meaning of "publication bias" is persistent divergence between the mean of published (statistically significant) estimatesβ and the true value of β. We thus fix the true value of β and examine the distribution of associated estimatesβ. We explore this issue further in an appendix, including estimating However, in a published work, β is unknown. We must therefore calculate:
E E β − β|β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) =E E β |β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) − β =ˆ E β |β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) − β f (β)dβ (2) under some reasonable assumptions about our prior beliefs about β, f (β). This estimate of publication bias will obviously be a function of our choice of f (β), and consequently it is advisable to estimate publication bias under a variety of choices for f (β) to ensure robust results.
We estimate the degree of expected publication bias in the political science literature as a proportion of the published result, E E β − β sign (β) |β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) / β pub .
The sign (β) term means that we measure the degree of bias in the direction of the true β (that is, as a function of the distance of the relationship from zero); this allows us to measure the degree to which the average published result exaggerates the true magnitude of a relationship. 5 The published estimateβ pub informs our assumption about the prior f (β) to recognize that each project comes out of a different family of projects pertaining to different subfields and topics whose magnitudes are difficult to compare across families. We consider two classes of f (β):
1. a spike-and-slab distribution with a spike at β = 0 and a uniform slab between −3 β pub , 3 β pub , and 2. a spike-and-normal distribution with a spike at β = 0 added to a normal distribution with standard deviation equal to β pub .
The first distribution represents a 33% probability prior belief that a non-zero |β| ≤ β pub , while the second represents a ≈ 68% probability prior belief that a non-zero |β| ≤ β pub ;
We set sign (β = 0) = 1.
our results are robust to other reasonable choices for the boundaries of the spike-and-slab prior and the standard deviation of the normal prior. 6 We systematically vary the height of the spike, Pr(β = 0), to determine how different expectations for the baseline rate of null relationships changes our view of the published literature. Finally, we repeat our analysis with no spike at β = 0, to recognize the possibility that a point null hypothesis is never true in real data (Gelman, 2011) .
We use our prior belief density f (β) to determine the relationship between true relationships and observed estimates using simulation. To do this, we generate 100,000 draws β from f (β) for each published study. For each draw ofβ, we simulate a sample estimatê
whereσβ is the published standard error ofβ pub and τ is the t-density with d f degrees of freedom equivalent to the published study. 7 We determine which of these results is statistically significant by comparing |t s | = β s /σβ to the t (df,0.05) two-tailed α = 0.05 critical value from a t-density with the appropriate degrees of freedom. Finally, we calculate β s −β sign β for each of the statistically significant draws. The average of this quantity is our estimate of E E β − β sign (β) |β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) . We then divide this by the absolute value of the published result, β pub , to calculate percentage bias.
Data set
We estimate the effect of publication bias on the literature in political science using a new data set of quantitative work recently published in prominent, general interest journals. Our 6 For example, if we change the uniform slab to range between −10 β pub , 10 β pub with a total Pr(β = 0) of 10%, we estimate a mean bias of 24.4% in our sample of published results. We also estimate that 50.7% of published results in our data set have a false positive probability above 10%. These magnitudes are lower than, but broadly comparable to those we show in Table 1 under the assumption that the slab in f (β) ranges between −3 β pub , 3 β pub . When the normal prior is set to a standard deviation of 10 β pub and Pr(β = 0) = 10%, we estimate a mean bias of 24.2% and that 50.7% of results have a false positive probability greater than 10%. 7 The degrees of freedom is set at n−k, where k is the number of estimated coefficients, whenever possible. If k was not reported in the study, we set the degrees of freedom at n − 2, the smallest plausible value (one slope coefficient plus the intercept). We omit these studies from our analysis as their interpretation is unclear in the context of assessing publication bias when using an α = 0.05 two-tailed significance test, leaving 142 studies for analysis. The consequence of omitting statistically insignificant results is that our estimates are upper bounds on the degree of publication bias in the literature:
the more likely it is that statistically insignificant results will be published, the smaller that publication bias will be.
A complete list of the rules we used to identify and code observations in our data set is provided in an appendix; we summarize the procedure here. 11 Each observation of the collected data set represents one article and contains the article's main finding (viz., an estimated marginal effect,β pub ). Defining the main finding of an article can be complicated, 8 We collect information of articles from the AJPS for shorter time period than that of the APSR because on average, there are more quantitative articles published in a single issue of the AJPS than in that of the APSR. We want to balance the number of articles collected from both journals, while collecting information of recently published articles. Focusing on the articles published in the APSR from 2008 to 2013 also allows us to contribute to the literature by introducing a new data set, given that the time period of the Gerber and Malhotra (2008a) data set is from 1995 to 2007.
9 138 articles in our data set have discrete dependent variables and three articles have continuous but bounded dependent variables.
10 33 studies (out of 314) in our data set specify a one-tailed test. This information is available in the "tails" variable in our replication dataset.
11 The complete set of coding sheets we used for all the articles we examined are available in an on-line only supplement.
as many articles present multiple results.
12 We code the main finding in the following way.
First, if there is any expression such as "the key independent variable" or "the main finding of this paper," we consider that relationship the main finding. If there is no such explicit phrasing, we consider the finding that is emphasized in the abstract or in the conclusion of a paper as the main finding. If there are multiple hypotheses that receive almost equal attention, we record the information of the first hypothesis ("H1" or "the first hypothesis").
Results
The result of applying this technique to the published (and statistically significant) marginal effects estimates in our data set reveals a substantial tendency toward upward bias in magnitude, as illustrated in Table 1 . As the table shows, if we have a baseline expectation that only 10% of our hypotheses correctly predict a relationship a priori, then over 50% of published findings are expected to be at least 10% larger in magnitude than the true relationship.
The typical published result in this scenario is on average at least 29% larger than the true relationship. Even if there are no relationships that are exactly zero under a normal prior density (with standard deviation equal to β pub ), over 40% of published results have ≥ 10% upward bias in magnitude. In general, the magnitude of the bias problem scales positively with the assumed underlying proportion of null results in the population of research ideas (Pr (β = 0)).
The implication of the analysis is that a substantial portion of published results overestimate the true size of the relationship being studied because statistical significance tests are used to screen results for publication. Biases that are large enough to be substantively meaningful are not uncommon; if our assumptions about f (β) are a good representation of 12 We chose to focus on one main finding per article so that our results would equally weight each paper's contribution to publication bias in the literature. Thus, to be precise, we estimate the publication bias of primary findings of papers in the discipline rather than for all published findings. Theoretically, we would expect within-article clustering of publication bias for multiple results presented in the same article for a variety of reasons: the results come from the same data set or model, are written by the same authors using the same research practices, and so on. Presenting one finding per article allows us to neglect this complication. Not all publications are equally susceptible to bias, as seen in Figure 1 . The figure shows that individual results vary greatly in terms of expected publication bias, regardless of the prior probability of a null effect Pr (β = 0). Indeed, Figure 1d shows substantial bias, and substantial variation among published results, for the normal prior even with no spike at β = 0. Importantly, the expected bias is strongly associated with the published p-value of the result: smaller p-values are associated with smaller expected bias. Our finding underscores a point made in the American Statistical Association's statment on p-values: "the widespread use of 'statistical significance' (generally interpreted as "p ≤ 0.05") as a license for making a claim of a scientific finding (or implied truth) leads to considerable distortion of the scientific process" (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016, p. 9) .
13 Interestingly, the Klein et al. (2014) replication study of 16 relationships in psychology finds an equal number of studies whose median replication effect size is larger and smaller than the original estimate (see Table 2 ); this may be because the authors deliberately chose some findings known to be robustly replicable in addition to newer findings with unknown replicability. 
/ β pub is calculated using the prior density indicated in the sub-figure's caption and the procedure described in Table 1 . The color of the bar indicates a published result p-value in the range listed by the sub-figure's legend.
Calculating susceptibility to false positives
Statistical significance testing is designed to lower the risk of concluding that a relationship exists when the evidence could be consistent with no relationship at all. However, it is well established (though perhaps not widely understood) that statistical significance testing is often insufficient to reduce the chance of a false positive to an acceptable level when the prior probability of studying a null relationship is very high (Goodman, 2001; Siegfried, 2010; Nuzzo, 2014; Bayarri et al., 2016) . A key factor is the prior probability that the null hypothesis is true (i.e., the a priori expectation that the relationship being studied does not actually exist). That is:
We can use this formula to calculate this probability for the observations in our data set;
this is similar to a calculation that Goodman (2001) and Bayarri et al. (2016) performed using Bayes' factors and to a closely related formula offered by Maniadis, Tufano and List (2014) . To establish a lower bound for Pr (β = 0|stat. sig.), we set Pr (stat. sig.|β = 0) = 1 to maximize the denominator of equation (3). We then set the prior probability Pr (β = 0) to a fixed value and calculated Pr (β = 0|stat. sig.) for a range of Pr (stat. sig.
The results for four different values of Pr (β = 0) are shown in Figure 2 ; the histogram in this figure indicates the distribution of p-values (i.e., the value of Pr (stat. sig.|β = 0)) in our data set.
As the figure shows, not all published work has an equal expected probability of being a false positive. Results that are close to the boundary of statistical significance (with p ≈ 0.05) have the greatest expected probability of being a false positive. Results that are further from this boundary (e.g., where p ≤ 0.01) are at substantially lower risk of being false positives.
This finding is consistent with the prior work of the Open Science Collaboration (2015, p. 0.95 *The figure shows the relationship between the probability that the null hypothesis is true given a statistically significant result (Pr (null|st. sig.)) as a function of the probability of obtaining a statistically significant result when the null hypothesis is true (Pr (st. sig.|null)) that is implied by equation 3. To establish a lower bound for Pr (null|st. sig.), we set Pr (stat. sig.|β =0) = 1 in equation 3. We set Pr (null) to several alternative values, as indicated in the figure's legend. The histogram shows the proportion of p-values in bins of width 0.005 for 142 published and statistically significant results in our data set.
aac4716-5), whose replications of notable findings in psychology discovered that "a negative correlation of replication success with the original study p value indicates that the initial strength of evidence is predictive of reproducibility. " Camerer et al. (2016) find the same relationship between p-values and replicability (p. 1435). The finding is consistent with the calculations of Goodman (2001) and Bayarri et al. (2016) , who shows that lower p-values are associated with greater reductions in the posterior probability of the null hypothesis (relative to its prior probability).
Figure 2 indicates that our concern about the likelihood of a false positive should be geometrically related to our prior belief about Pr (β = 0) and almost linearly related to a result's p-value. When Pr (β = 0) ≤ 0.5, the probability of a false positive never exceeds 5% in our calculation. However, if Pr (β = 0) = 0.75, we calculate that ≈ 10.6% of the published results in our data set have Pr (β = 0|stat. sig.) ≥ 10%. When Pr (β = 0) = 0.9, ≈ 25.4% of the published results in our data set have Pr (β = 0|stat. sig.) ≥ 10%. Over 40% of these results have have Pr (β = 0|stat. sig.) ≥ 10% if Pr (β = 0) = 0.95. Our finding may explain why so many results fail to replicate. For example, the Open Science Collaboration was able to successfully replicate only 39 of 100 relationships from the psychology literature that it tested in its study (Open Science Collaboration, 2015, p. aac-4716-5) . A survey of researchers in psychology and allied fields by Hartshorne and Schachner (2012) found that only 49% of attempted replications were able to fully replicate a study's original findings (p. 3). In economics, Camerer et al. (2016) were able to successfully replicate only 11 of the 18 studies they examined, a 61% success rate. Even in medicine, a recent study by Prinz, Schlange and Khusru (2011) found that their laboratory was only able to completely replicate between 20% and 25% of the published work examined.
Conclusions and Implications
The problem of publication bias has been studied for years and permeates all scientific disciplines that use statistical evidence (Rosenthal, 1979; Sterling, Rosenbaum and Winkam, 1995) . Interest in the problem has been reignited by effort to replicate results in multiple disciplines that have met with a surprisingly high rate of failure (Hartshorne and Schachner, 2012; Klein et al., 2014; Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014; Ioannidis et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Boekel et al., 2015; Camerer et al., 2016 (Sterling, Rosenbaum and Winkam, 1995; Coursol and Wagner, 1986; Gerber, Green and Nickerson, 2001; Gerber and Malhotra, 2008a,b; Brodeur et al., 2016) . We believe that our paper complements the findings of large-scale replication projects by placing them into a clearer theoretical context: under reasonable assumptions for the prior distribution of effects f (β), the results of these studies are what we should expect given (a) the existence of a publication process that favors statistically significant results and (b) the distribution of published results in the literature. In short, our findings suggest that publication bias is a reasonable explanation for at least part of the "replication crisis."
Based on our evidence, results with smaller p-values are less affected by publication bias because they are further from the α = 0.05 threshold. These results are also at lesser risk of being a false positive (Goodman, 2001; Bayarri et al., 2016) . However, using a decreased threshold for statistical significance (i.e., only publishing results that can pass a significance test with α lower than 0.05), as suggested by Johnson (2013) , simply recreates the problem for results near the new threshold. Consider the simulations of Table 1 for the spikeand-slab prior when Pr (β = 0) = 90%: using a significance threshold of α = 0.01 results in 66.9% of estimates exceeding 10% magnitude in bias (compared to 87.3% of estimates using the α = 0.05 threshold). When Pr (β = 0) = 0% under the same prior, using a significance threshold of α = 0.01 results in 20.4% of estimates exceeding 10% magnitude in bias (compared to 14.1% of estimates using the α = 0.05 threshold).
The empirical "credibility revolution" in economics and political science has rightfully made us ask harder questions of the quality of our research designs on a paper-to-paper basis (Angrist and Pischke, 2010) . But as long as statistically significant results are privileged in the publication process, even researchers who do everything right from a causal identification perspective could still produce a literature with results that are (on average) biased upward and overpopulated with false positives. Just as the credibility revolution has made us more skeptical of some research designs, we believe that our findings (and the larger universe of findings concerning replicability) demand increased skepticism of novel results. This is particularly true if the result is only marginally statistically significant, because marginally significant results are at increased risk of being false positives. Consequently, it may be prudent to place less importance on the novelty and originality of a scholar's output in evaluating his or her contribution to the discipline-recognizing, of course, that these are still important and valuable qualities!-and more importance on work that checks the robustness of existing findings, including replication studies. We should also be careful about allowing the initial discovery of a new phenomenon to shape our research agenda before the phenomenon is thoroughly replicated. In the event that the discovery is a false positive, researchers seeking to apply the findings to other areas will necessarily be building their work on a null finding, thereby raising the overall prior probability of null hypotheses (viz., Pr(β = 0)) in the population and making the overall problem of publication bias even worse.
We think that these changes constitute a substantial revision to the status quo, but one that is important to safeguard the reliability of the findings that we communicate to each other, to our students, and to the larger world. 
Appendix A: Alternative Measures of Bias
As stated in footnote 4,
and bias in one does not imply bias in the other. To illustrate this principle, we draw 30,000 simulated true values of β from ∼ U [−3, 3] and then simulate estimatesβ = β + ε, ε ∼ φ(µ = 0, σβ = 0.4). We determine which of these results is statistically significant by comparing |t s | = β /0.4 to the t (df,0.05) critical value from a t-density with d f = 100 degrees of freedom. Finally, we use this simulated dataset to fit a loess model predicting β withβ (to estimate E β|β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) ) or predictingβ with β (to estimate E β |β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) ). Both of these relationships are depicted in Figure 3 . As the figure shows, for a uniformly distributed f (β), E β|β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) ≈ β for all values of β. However, E β |β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) = β for β values close to the boundaries of statistical significance (i.e., β ≈ t (df,0.05) * σβ).
In the main text, we focus on presenting estimates of E E β − β|β, t ≥ t (df,0.05) as evidence of publication bias. However, we calculatedβ pub − E β|β pub , t ≥ t (df,0.05) for our data set as well. To do this, we generate 100,000 drawsβ from the prior density f (β)
for each published study. For each draw ofβ, we simulate a sample estimateβ s =β +σβε,
whereσβ is the published standard error ofβ pub and τ is the t-density with d f degrees of freedom equivalent to the published study.
14 We determine which of these results is statistically significant by comparing |t s | = β s /σβ to the t (df,0.05) critical value from a t-density with the appropriate degrees of freedom. Finally, we use this simulated dataset to estimate the relationship between true relationships and observed estimates by using a loess β ∼ Φ 0, β pub with probability (1 − p) and β = 0 with probability p for each published study; the assumed value of p is listed in column 1. For each draw ofβ, we simulate a sample estimateβs =β + ε, ε ∼ φ(0, σ =σ) whereσ is the published standard error ofβ pub . We determine which of these results is statistically significant by comparing |ts| = β s/σβ to the t (df ,0.05) critical value for an α = 0.05 test (two-tailed) from a t-density with degrees of freedom equivalent to the published study. Finally, we use the simulated dataset of statistically significant estimates to estimate the relationship between true relationships and observed estimates by using a loess model to predictβ withβs. iii. Record 3 if the dependent variable is discrete.
(n) What is the number of independent variables in the analysis (excluding the intercept)?
i. If the number of independent variables is present, record the number of independent variables. ii. If there is no information, leave blank.
4. Record further information about the article.
(a) Is the article a replication of another article that was published beforehand or is published simultaneously?
i. If the article is an original analysis, record 0.
ii. If the article is a replication of a pre-existing work, assign an integer group number bigger than 0 identical to the original work and other replications.
(b) Does the article contain more than one dependent variable (e.g. different operationalization of the same concept) and conduct empirical analysis multiple times?
i. If only one dependent variable is specified, record 1.
ii. If more than one dependent variable is specified, record information for each model (using the questions above) and assign an integer number for each model. i. Record any relevant information, including: identifying models which are not a simple regression; which elements above are missing in the article; if there is a corrigendum of the article; etc.
